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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Most climate scientists agree on (as do most of the heads of the states of the 
Western world) that the main cause of the global warming is human 
enhancement of the so-called ‘greenhouse effect’, i.e. the trapping of the 
Sun’s warmth in planet’s lower atmosphere.1 The Sun warms Earth’s 
surface, which radiates the heat back towards space. The atmosphere 
contains radiatively active gases, e.g. water vapour (H2O), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), methane (CH4), and carbon dioxide (CO2). As these so-called 
‘greenhouse gases’ (hereafter referred to as ‘GHG’) exist in atmosphere, 
most of the heat from the Sun is absorbed by GHG molecules and re-emitted 
in all directions. In this process, the atmosphere traps heat radiating from 
Earth towards space. Thus, heat is blocked from escaping the atmosphere, 
which results in the greenhouse effect that warms Earth.2  
In the battle against the global warming, CO2 is the big villain. According to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), CO2 is the human 
influenced climate driver that most affects the warming of Earth.3 
Furthermore, CO2 remains in the atmosphere longer than the other major 
heath trapping gases emitted in course of human activities. Much of CO2 
emitted today will be gone in 100 years, but around 20% will exist in the 
atmosphere also after approximately 800 years.4 Against the background of 
CO2: s significant effect on the global warming and its long-lasting 
character, the willingness to curb CO2 emissions is not surprising. 
In 2010, the Commission launched ‘Europe 2020’5 which is a 10-year 
strategy for the advancement and rehabilitation of EU’s economy in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The aim of this strategy is to turn the 
EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy.6 To guide efforts and 
steer progress, the Commission proposed that the EU should commonly 
agree on a limited number of headline targets for 2020, representative of the 
theme of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.7 From a sustainability 
perspective, Europe 2020 strategy aims at promoting a more resource 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Dana Nuccitelli, ‘Is the climate consensus 97%, 99.9%, or is plate tectonics a 
hoax?’ The Guardian (3 May 2017)  
2 ‘Causes of Climate Change; A Blanket around the Earth’ (NASA) 
3 ‘Climate Change 2007: Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis; Human and 
Natural Drivers of Climate Change’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC) 
4 ‘Why does CO2 get most of the attention when there are so many other heat-trapping 
gases (greenhouse gases)?’ (Union of Concerned Scientists)  
5 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final 
6 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 5 
7 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 10 
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efficient, greener and more competitive economy.  To this end, the 
Commission proposed the ‘20-20-20’ climate and energy targets as one of 
the Europe 2020 headline targets.8 The ’20-20-20’ targets entail that the EU 
should (1) reduce its GHG emissions by at least 20% (30%)9 compared to 
1990 levels; (2) increase the share of renewable energy sources in our final 
energy consumption to 20%; and (3) reach a 20% increase in energy 
efficiency.10 Furthermore, the Commission put forward seven flagship 
initiatives in the Europe 2020 strategy to catalyse progress.11 The flagship 
initiative of ‘Resource efficient Europe’ aims at supporting the shift towards 
a resource efficient and low-carbon economy. Particularly, the objective of 
that initiative is to decouple EU’s economic growth from resource and 
energy use, reduce CO2 emissions, enhance competitiveness, and promote 
greater energy security.12  
As the Commission pointed out in the ‘Transport White Paper of 2011’13, 
transport and mobility are critical for the realisation of the internal market. 
As the Commission has pointed out: “European Transport is at cross roads. 
Old challenges remain but new have come.”14 
 On the one hand, oil will become scarcer in the future, and sourced 
increasingly from uncertain supplies. Accordingly, the less decarbonising 
succeeds, the more the oil price will increase. Hence, the challenge is to 
break EU’s dependence on oil without sacrificing the transport system’s 
efficiency, compromising mobility, or endangering the security and the 
competitiveness of the EU economy.15 In line with the Europe 2020 strategy 
and the Energy Efficiency Plan of 201116, the ultimate goal of EU’s 
transport policy is to design a transport system that underpins EU’s 
                                                 
8 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 5 
9 By 30% provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable 
emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. See Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy 
for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 
footnote 2, 11  
10 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 11 
11 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 5 
12 Commission, ‘EUROPE 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ 
(Communication) COM(2010) 2020 final, 15 
13 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final 
14 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 3, 3 
15 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, paras 5 and 
17, 3 and 5 
16 Commission, ‘Energy Efficiency Plan 2011’ (Communication) COM(2011) 109 final 
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economic progress, enhances competitiveness and offers high quality 
mobility services while using resources more efficiently.17  
On the other hand, the international community has agreed that there is an 
urgent need to drastically reduce world GHG emissions with a goal of 
limiting climate change below 2 Celsius.18 Overall, the EU needs to reduce 
emissions by 80–95% below the 1990 levels by 2050.19 In the transport 
sector, this would mean that a reduction of at least 60% of the 1990 GHG 
emission levels would be required, which would correspond to emissions 
cuts of around 70% compared to the emission levels of 2008.20 At the same 
time, transport sector is a significant, and still growing, source of GHG 
emissions.21 Even though EU transport sector has become more energy 
efficient, it still depends on oil and oil products for 96% of its energy 
needs.22 As the Commission puts it, it is thus clear that EU’s transport sector 
cannot develop along the same path.23 
Carbon is present in hydrocarbon fuels and is converted to CO2 when 
combusted. Road traffic contributes about 20% of the EU’s total emissions 
of CO2.24 There is a common EU ambition to reduce road traffic related CO2 
emissions. At the same time, more resource-efficient vehicles and cleaner 
fuels are unlikely to achieve, on their own, the necessary cuts in CO2 
emissions related to road traffic.25  Therefore, there are persuasive reasons 
why also levies on road transport related CO2 emissions should be 
restructured in the direction of wider application of the ‘polluter-pays 
principle’.26  
The polluter-pays principle states that “the polluter or those who otherwise 
engage in environmentally degrading activities should bear the cost of 
measures to reduce pollution or other environmentally degrading activity   
                                                 
17 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 17, 5 
18 See e.g. ‘The Paris Agreement’ (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change)  
19 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 6, 3 
20 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 6 and 
footnote 2, 3 
21 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 6, 3 
22 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 7, 3–4 
23 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 13, 4 
24 ‘Road Transport: Reducing CO2 emissions from vehicles’ (European Commission 
Climate Action) (last updated 10 May 2017)  
25 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 22, 6 
26 Commission, ’Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive 
and resource efficient transport system’ (White Paper) COM(2011) 144 final, para 58, 15 
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according to the extent of either the damage done to society or the 
exceeding of an acceptable level (standard) of pollution”27. When market-
based instruments, such as environmentally related levies, are used to 
implement the polluter-pays principle, the underlying rationale is to 
incentivise a shift to less damaging activities by making the environmentally 
degrading activities financially costly.28 This perception builds on the 
Pigouvian prescription of internalising externalities, which, when reduced to 
a simplified essence, asserts that “levies equal to the externalities could 
equalize the private and social marginal costs”29. 
In the context of road traffic, this means the following. The road users have 
to pay costs that are directly related to the use, e.g. vehicle, fuel, insurance 
etc. Such costs are considered private as they are paid directly by the user. 
Nevertheless, road transport generates also negative externalities that 
involve a cost to the society and the economy. The effect of GHG emissions 
on climate change is an example of an externality that road transport 
generates. However, from the road user’s perspective, the costs related to 
externalities are external in the sense that he does not directly bear those. 
Instead, external costs are generally borne by the state and its citizens. The 
sum of the marginal private cost and the marginal external costs of road 
transport gives its marginal social cost.30 Hence, in theory, internalising CO2 
emissions related to road traffic (i.e. the externality) would demand that the 
cost of CO2 emissions on the society (i.e. the external cost) would be 
included in the road user’s costs so that those would equal the marginal 
social cost. 
Traditionally, when it comes to curbing CO2 emissions from motor vehicles,  
carbon tax on fuel and EU Emissions Trading System (hereafter referred to 
as ‘EU ETS’) are the market-based instruments that have been around in 
discussions.31 However, for some time now, voices have been raised in 
favour of introducing a road toll system that would vary costs based on a 
vehicle’s CO2 emissions.32 Effectively, the Commission is scheduled to 
                                                 
27 ‘Polluter-Pays Principle’ (OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms 11 December 2001)  
28 See e.g. Sally-Ann Joseph, ’Environmental taxes – definitional analysis: behavioural 
change or revenue raising’ in Larry Kreiser et al. (eds), Environmental Taxation and Green 
Fiscal Reform; Theory and Impact (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014), 188 
29 Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen, ‘Introduction to environmental taxation 
concepts and research’ in Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen (eds), Handbook of 
Research on Environmental Taxation (Edward Elgar 2014), 17 
30 ‘Marginal Social Cost – MSC’ (Investopedia) 
31 See e.g. Commission, ‘Strategy for the internalisation of external costs’ 
(Communication) COM(2008) 435 final, 3 and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the 
taxation of energy products and electricity’ COM(2011) 169 final 
32 See e.g. Catherine Strupp, ‘MEPs demand Commission propose tolls on trucks to curb 
CO2 emissions’ EURACTIV.com (20 November 2015); ‘CO2 differentiated truck tolls – 
what the EU should do’ (Transport & Environment 30 September 2015); ‘Road charging 
for cars; What the European Commission should do’ (Transport & Environment May 2017) 
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review the Eurovignette Directive33 which sets the parameters by which 
Member States may impose either a distance-based or a time-based levy for 
‘heavy-duty vehicles’ (hereafter referred to as ‘HDVs’)34 on certain road 
infrastructures. This review is intended to take place during the second 
quarter of 2017.35 In 2016, it was announced that the Commission has on its 
agenda to propose a distance-based levy, i.e. a so-called ‘road toll’36, on 
not only HDVs but also buses, coaches and ‘private vehicles’37, the amount 
of which would be, at least partially, calculated based on the vehicle’s CO2 
emissions.38  
From EU law viewpoint, the case of curbing CO2 emissions from motor 
vehicles is of interest for two main reasons. Firstly, safeguarding internal 
market requirements and undistorted competition is one of the EU’s basic 
principles. When Member States impose levies on CO2 emissions from 
motor vehicles, there is an inherent risk that the freedoms of movement are 
restricted, that discrimination based on nationality occurs, and that the 
national laws or practices result in unsanctioned state aid and are thus 
contrary to Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. Secondly, motor fuels fall within 
the scope of the harmonised EU excise duty system. Since there is an 
inextricable link between the amount CO2 emitted by a carbon fuel vehicle 
(or vehicle combination) during a given distance and the amount carbon in 
the fuel that the vehicle consumes during that same distance, the EU 
secondary law on indirect taxation is of central interest. At the same time, 
also road charging is regulated at EU level by the Eurovignette Directive. 
Accordingly, Member States, when imposing levies on CO2 emissions from 
motor vehicles, must, in accordance with their Treaty obligation of sincere 
cooperation, not only comply with EU primary law but also ensure 
                                                 
33 Consolidated version of Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 June 1999 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain 
infrastructures as it stands 22 May 2017 
34 In this paper, the term ‘HDV’ is used for the vehicles falling within the scope of the 
Eurovignette Directive. Thus, HDVs are defined as motor vehicles and articulated vehicle 
combinations intended or used for the carriage by road of goods having a maximum 
permissible laden weight of over 3.5 tonnes, see Articles 1 and 2(d) of the Eurovignette 
Directive. 
35 ‘Legislative train schedule; resilient energy union with a climate change policy; revision 
of the Directive 1999/62/EC on charging of heavy-goods vehicles for use of certain use of 
certain infrastructures (Eurovignette Directive)/before 2017-07’ (European Parliament) 
36 In this paper, the term ‘road toll’ is used as defined in Article 2(b) of the Eurovignette 
Directive, i.e. meaning a specified amount payable for a vehicle based on the distance 
travelled on a given infrastructure and on the type of the vehicle. 
37 In this paper, the term ‘private vehicles’ is used as defined in COM(2012) 199 final, i.e. 
for passenger cars, motor cycles, and other motor vehicles with a permissible laden weight 
of no more than 3.5 tonnes, used predominantly for private purposes. See Commission, ‘on 
the application of national road infrastructure charges levied on light private vehicles’ 
(Communication) COM(2012) 199 final, footnote 3, 3 
38 Commission, ‘A European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility’ (Communication) 
COM(2016) 501 final, 4 
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compliance with the EU secondary law on indirect taxation and the 
Eurovignette Directive.39 
1.2 Purpose 
The Author intends, with this Thesis, to answer the following research 
question:  
What possibilities do Member States have to impose levies 
on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles in the light of EU 
indirect tax law and the Eurovignette Directive? 
1.3 Method and material 
This paper is a descriptive study de lege lata, i.e. a study of law as it stands. 
The method the Author has employed to that end is the legal-dogmatic 
method in combination with the EU law method. Furthermore, the Author 
employs some basic elements of the theory of public finance to explain the 
interconnections between the legal issues related to imposing a levy on CO2 
emissions from motor vehicles and the economic theory on how market-
based environmental policy instruments operate. 
The legal-dogmatic method concerns researching current positive law as 
laid down in sources of law.40 The EU law method, in turn, governs the 
Author’s choice of sources of law and the mutual hierarchy of those.  
When EU law method is used, the EU sources of primary law and those of 
secondary law, as well as supplementary sources of EU law, are employed. 
EU primary law consists mainly of the Treaties.41 EU secondary law 
consists of binding legislative acts, i.e. regulations, directives, and 
decisions,42 and non-binding legislative acts which include 
recommendations and opinions but also other documents, such as 
resolutions, programmes, notices etc.43 Of supplementary sources of EU 
law, international agreements, case law, and the general principles of EU 
law are binding. Travaux préparatoires, the opinions of the Advocate 
                                                 
39 Article 4(3) TEU 
40 Sjoerd Douma, Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law, (Wolters Kluwer 
2014), 17–18 
41 ‘Primary law’ (EUR-Lex 12 August 2010) and Jörgen Hettne, ’1.3 ’Primär- och 
sekundärrätt’ in Jörgen Hettne and Ida Otken Eriksson (eds) EU-rättslig metod; teori och 
genomslag i svensk rättstillämpning (2nd edn Norstedts Juridik 2011), 41–42 
42 Article 288 TFEU 
43 Article 288 TFEU and Jörgen Hettne, ’1.3 ’Primär- och sekundärrätt’ and ’1.5 Icke-
bindande rättsakter’ in Jörgen Hettne and Ida Otken Eriksson (eds) EU-rättslig metod; teori 
och genomslag i svensk rättstillämpning (2nd edn Norstedts Juridik 2011), 42 and 46–47 
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Generals, literature and economic theories are, on the other hand, only to 
give guidance.44 
The presumption of the method of law and economics is that the goal of 
legislation is to reach an efficient outcome.45 However, in this paper, the 
method of law and economics is not used to argue de lege ferenda what 
would be the most efficient way for the EU or Member States to curb CO2 
emissions from motor vehicles. Yet, environmental levies, such as a carbon 
tax on fuel or CO2 differentiated road tolls, are market-based environmental 
policy instruments that aim to address the market failure of environmental 
externalities. For this reason, in Chapter 5, the method of law and 
economics, or, more precisely, very basic elements of public finance theory, 
is used to explain how these instruments work in theory to correct the 
market failure. The Author’s intention with this way of contemplating the 
issue is to make it more understandable. 
The Author’s purpose with this paper is to examine Member States’ 
possibilities to impose levies on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles in the 
light of EU indirect tax legislation and the Eurovignette Directive. 
Moreover, the Author has limited her study to an examination of EU 
secondary law implications (see below Chapter 1.4) on Member States’ 
margin of appreciation in this respect. Naturally, this also has consequences 
regarding the use of sources.  
With respect to the Author’s choice of topic, the following secondary 
legislative acts are the starting point for her study: The General 
Arrangements Directive46; the Energy Taxation Directive47; the VAT 
Directive48; and the Eurovignette Directive. Also, case law of the CJEU 
related to the interpretation of Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of the General 
Arrangements Directive is studied in order to clarify the limits of the 
Member States’ margin of appreciation in relation to EU excise duty system 
when imposing levies on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. Most of the 
                                                 
44 Jörgen Hettne, ’1.2 ’EU-rättskällornas inbördes förhållanden’ in Jörgen Hettne and Ida 
Otken Eriksson (eds) EU-rättslig metod; teori och genomslag i svensk rättstillämpning 
(2nd edn Norstedts Juridik 2011), 40 
45 Christian Dahlman, Marcus Glader and David Reidhav, Rättsekonomi; En introduktion 
(Studentlitteratur 2004), 9 
46 Consolidated version of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 
concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC as 
it stands 22 May 2017 
47 Consolidated version of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring 
the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity as it stands 22 
May 2017 
48 Consolidated version of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the 
common system of value added tax as it stands 22 May 2017 
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referred case law concerns the Horizontal Excise Directive49 that preceded 
the General Arrangements Directive. In this Thesis, however, the Author 
has decided, when referring to the case law, to consistently refer to the up-
to-date corresponding provisions in the General Arrangements Directive. 
Furthermore, the reason why no case law is discussed in relation to the 
Eurovignette Directive is that there is no case law where the CJEU would 
have discussed the Eurovignette Directive in the light of EU indirect tax 
legislation.  
Travaux préparatoires, i.e. Commission proposals, a White Paper, and 
communications from the Commission, are used as material to describe the 
legislative trends and developments related to imposing levies on CO2 
emissions from motor vehicles at EU level. In addition, the Author has 
consulted relevant literature especially in connection to the analysis of 
Member States’ margin of appreciation to impose levies on CO2 emissions 
from motor vehicles in the light of EU indirect tax law. Vis-à-vis the 
relationship between the Eurovignette Directive and EU indirect tax law, 
earlier research shines with its absence. 
Because of the time limitation for the conclusion of this Thesis, EU 
legislative acts, case law of the CJEU, and travaux préparatoires are taken 
into account as of 22 May 2017 which is the date of handing in the raw 
manuscript of the Thesis before the opposition seminar.   
1.4 Delimitations 
The primary law questions related to potential distortions of competition in 
the internal market are not dealt with in this Thesis more than by mentioning 
in passing. With respect to the questions related to EU primary law in 
context of taxing CO2 emissions, Readers with knowledge of Scandinavian 
languages are referred to Sebastian Houe’s book CO2-beskatning i et EU-
retligt og nationalt perspektiv50 that is based on his doctoral thesis. 
Furthermore, the Author has decided to limit levies relating to ownership 
and registration of motor vehicles outside the scope of this Thesis. The 
Author wants also to emphasise that EU ETS which, for that matter, is not 
an issue of EU indirect taxation, is not dealt with. 
1.5 Outline 
In Chapter 2, the EU excise duty system is introduced. In more detail, the 
Author presents the relevant EU secondary law provisions and case law of 
the CJEU in relation to Member States’ margin of appreciation when it 
                                                 
49 Council Directive 92/12/EEC of 25 February 1992 on the general arrangements for 
products subject to excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of such 
products (repealed) 
50 Sebastian Houe, CO2-beskatning i et EU-retligt og nationalt perspektiv (Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets forlag 2013) 
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comes to imposing levies on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles vis-à-vis 
the harmonised EU excise duty system. In Chapter 3, the character of a 
general tax of EU VAT is described. In Chapter 4, the central provisions of 
the Eurovignette Directive that are relevant for the Author’s topic are 
introduced. In Chapter 5, the Author analyses Member States’ possibilities 
to impose levies on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. The market-based 
environmental policy instruments included in the analysis are carbon tax on 
fuel and CO2 differentiated road tolls. In Chapter 6, the Author examines the 
Commission’s agendas and initiatives to include the external cost of road 
traffic related CO2 emissions in the price of road tolls. Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes the Thesis. 
2 EU excise duties 
As Cnossen has put it: “Broadly speaking, the distinguishing features of 
excise taxation are selectivity in coverage, discrimination in intent, and 
often some form of quantitative measurement in determining the tax 
liability.”51 Excise taxation, i.e. selective taxes, duties or charges on goods 
and services, are among the oldest forms of taxation in the world.52 Excise 
taxation has variable objectives. Traditionally, the purpose of excise 
taxation has mainly been fiscal, i.e. gathering revenue for general purposes. 
Later, other objectives have amplified the scale of purposes that excise 
taxation serves. These specifically include internalising external costs in 
accordance with the Pigouvian prescription, discouraging consumption of 
health depriving products, and charging for the use of government-provided 
road infrastructure.53  
In the EU, excise duties are partly harmonised. The General Arrangements 
Directive sets the general scheme of EU excise duty that Member States 
must follow when drafting their excise duty laws. There are three groups of 
commodities that are subject to the EU general arrangements procedure. 
These are (1) energy products and electricity; (2) alcohol and alcoholic 
beverages; and (3) manufactured tobacco.54 The structure of the excise duty 
on alcohol and alcoholic beverages is regulated in the Alcohol Structures 
                                                 
51 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘Economics and Politics of Excise Taxation’ in S Cnossen (ed) Theory 
and Practice of Excise Taxation: Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Polluting, and Driving (e-
book 2005 OUP), 2 
52 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘Economics and Politics of Excise Taxation’ in Sijbren Cnossen (ed) 
Theory and Practice of Excise Taxation: Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Polluting, and 
Driving (e-book 2005 OUP), 1 
53 Sijbren Cnossen, ‘Economics and Politics of Excise Taxation’ in Sijbren Cnossen (ed) 
Theory and Practice of Excise Taxation: Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Polluting, and 
Driving (e-book 2005 OUP), 1–5 
54 Article 1(1) of the General Arrangements Directive 
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Directive55. The Alcohol Rates Directive56, in turn, sets the minimum rates 
for excise duty that Member States must apply on alcohol and alcoholic 
beverages. Regarding energy products and electricity as well as 
manufactured tobacco, both the structure of and the minimum rates for 
excise duty are covered by the Energy Taxation Directive and the Tobacco 
Taxation Directive57, respectively. 
Article 1 of the General Arrangements Directive defines the scope. Article 
1(1) of the General Arrangements Directive lays down the arrangements in 
relation to excise duty which is levied directly or indirectly on ‘excise 
goods’, i.e. energy products and electricity, alcohol and alcoholic beverages, 
and manufactured tobacco. Thus, the starting point is that excise duties on 
the defined excise goods are harmonised within the EU.  
However, it is possible for Member States to introduce national taxes with a 
connection to excise goods under Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of the General 
Arrangements Directive. Of Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements 
Directive follows that Member States may levy other indirect taxes on 
excise goods for specific purposes. However, in such cases Member States 
must comply with certain essential elements of EU rules relating to indirect 
taxes in order not to jeopardise the useful effect of those rules.58 
Accordingly, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive further 
prescribes that levying other indirect taxes on excise goods for specific 
purposes is subject to the condition that those taxes comply with the EU tax 
rules applicable for excise duties or VAT as far as determination of the tax 
base, calculation of the tax, chargeability and monitoring of the tax are 
concerned, but not including the provisions on exemptions. 
Furthermore, as Article 1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive 
stipulates, Member States may levy taxes on products other than excise 
goods and on the supply of services, including those relating to excise 
goods, which cannot be characterised as turnover taxes. However, the 
levying of such taxes may not, in trade between Member States, give rise to 
formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.59 As elaborated below, 
                                                 
55 Consolidated version of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the 
harmonization of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages as it 
stands 22 May 2017 
56 Council Directive 92/84/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of rates of excise 
duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages as it stands 22 May 2017 
57 Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty 
applied to manufactured tobacco as it stands 22 May 2017 
58 Recital (4) to the preamble of the General Arrangements Directive 
59 Schröer-Schallenberg has notified that some scholars have taken a very restrictive view 
regarding the prerequisite of the levy not giving rise to any formalities connected with the 
crossing of frontiers claiming that any control of cross-border trade, including domestic 
fiscal supervision performed as part of national tax regimes, would be contrary to Article 
1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive. As Schöer-Schallenberg, in the Author’s view, 
correctly points out, that interpretation of Article 1(3) of the General Arrangements 
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the key difference between Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of the General 
Arrangements Directive is thus that a levy to which Article 1(2) applies 
must have a specific purpose while Article 1(3) presents no such 
requirement.60 
2.1 Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive 
2.1.1 A levy for a specific purpose does not necessarily have to apply 
to a whole category of excise goods 
In Commission v France, France had introduced a social security 
contribution on tobacco and alcoholic beverages that was levied on the 
ground of the health risks involved in immoderate consumption of those 
products (hereafter referred to as ‘the social security contribution’).61  
While the Commission acknowledged that the social security contribution, 
in itself, pursued a specific purpose within the meaning of Article 1(2) of 
the General Arrangements Directive, it took the view that its scope and tax 
base were incompatible with the Alcohol Structures Directive.62 As the 
social security contribution was only levied on alcoholic beverages having 
greater than 25% in alcohol by volume (ABV), the Commission considered 
that it had a disparity in scope with the Alcohol Structures Directive which 
sets out the definition of ‘ethylic alcohol’ for products exceeding 22% ABV. 
Thus, the French legislation, in the Commission’s opinion, created a specific 
sub-category of alcoholic products not envisaged by the Alcohol Structures 
Directive for Alcohol.63 Furthermore, the Commission criticised the fact that 
the social security contribution was determined by reference to the volume 
of the beverage, while the Alcohol Structures Directive provided, as the tax 
base for excise duty on ethyl alcohol, the number of hectolitres of pure 
alcohol.64 
                                                                                                                            
Directive would, however, amount to a prohibition of non-harmonised excise duties, which 
would contradict the aim behind the General Arrangements Directive. Thus, Schröer-
Schallenberg is of the opinion that only control measures imposed in conjunction with the 
crossing of internal frontiers, i.e. routine border controls, would be unlawful. See Sabine 
Schröer-Schallenberg, ‘The legality of non-harmonised excise duties in the European 
internal market using the Federal Republic of Germany as an example’ (2012) 6(2) World 
Customs Journal, under sub-chapter 2.1.3 ‘Must not give rise to any formalities with the 
crossing of frontiers’ 
60 This is clear from the letter of Article 1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive as it 
stands today but has also been confirmed by the CJEU in case Case C-491/03 Ottmar 
Hermann v Stadt Frankfurt am Main [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:157, paras 31–34  
61 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 6 
62 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 7 
63 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98,, para 8 
64 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 9 
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Firstly, the CJEU pointed out that it is crucial to observe that the 
harmonisation achieved by the EU excise duty sytem is no more than 
partial.65 In fact, Article 1(2) was inserted in the General Arrangements 
Directive because of the different fiscal traditions in Member States with 
regard to the structure of the excise duties and the frequent recourse to 
indirect taxes for the purpose of implementing non-budgetary policies.66 
Thus, the provision was designed to allow Member States to establish, in 
addition to the minimum excise duty fixed by the Alcohol Structures 
Directive, other indirect taxes for a specific purpose.67  
Regarding the Commission’s complaint that the social security contribution 
did not apply to the category of alcoholic beverages, as defined in the 
Alcohol Structures Directive, in full, the CJEU remarked that Article 1(2) of 
the General Arrangements Directive did not, on this point, demand the 
compliance with the EU rules applicable for excise duty or VAT purposes.68 
As to the Commission’s complaint that the amount of the social security 
contribution was proportionate to the quantity of the beverage, irrespective 
of its alcohol content, the CJEU held that this tax base, in fact, was 
consistent with the general scheme of tax rules applicable for excise duty 
purposes. Neither was it precluded by the Alcohol Structures Directive, 
since it takes the quantity as tax base for excise duty on wine and fermented 
beverages other than wine and beer.69 Consequently, the CJEU dismissed 
the Commission’s application.70 
2.1.2 The requirement of a specific purpose 
The CJEU has ruled in several occasions that a specific purpose is other 
than a budgetary purpose.71 In EKW72, the CJEU was asked to take stand at 
                                                 
65 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 17 
66 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 18 
67 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 19 
68 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, paras 29–30 
69 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, paras 31–32 
70 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 33 
71 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 19, Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v 
Abgabenberufungskommission Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 33, Case C-491/03 Ottmar Hermann v Stadt Frankfurt am 
Main [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:157, para 16, Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v 
Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 23 and Case C-553/13 
Tallinna Ettevõtlusamet v Statoil Fuel & Retail Eesti AS [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:149, para 
37 
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an Austrian municipal duty. This so-called ‘beverage duty’ was levied on 
the supply for consideration of ice cream and beverages, including alcoholic 
beverages, to consumers.73 The EKW, which operated a hospital cafeteria, 
had become subject of a recovery assessment under which it was requested 
to pay beverage duty on sales during a certain period.74 The EKW 
challenged the recovery assessment as it considered that the beverage duty 
was contrary to EU law, in particular Article 401 of the VAT Directive 
(regarding this argument, see Chapter 3) and Article 1 of the General 
Arrangements Directive.75  
To begin with, the CJEU accentuated that Article 1 of the General 
Arrangements Directive contains different provisions depending on whether 
the product subject to the duty is an excise good listed in paragraph (1), 
which is the case with alcoholic beverages, or whether it is not so 
mentioned. Thus, the CJEU drew a distinction between alcoholic beverages 
on the one hand, and non-alcoholic beverages and ice cream on the other 
hand.76  
Purportedly, the specific purpose of the beverage duty was to reinforce the 
municipalities’ tax autonomy.77 The CJEU maintained that the purpose of 
reinforcing municipal tax autonomy through the grant of power to generate 
tax income constituted a purely budgetary objective, which could not, taken 
alone, constitute a specific purpose.78 Furthermore, it was also submitted 
that the specific purpose of the beverage duty was to be found in the need to 
offset the substantial costs borne by municipalities in connection with 
tourism.79 The CJEU dismissed this explanation with reference to the fact 
                                                                                                                            
72 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110 
73 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 4 
74 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 12 
75 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 14 
76 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 27 
77 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 32 
78 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 33 
79 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 34 
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that municipalities were not required to assign the income from the duty to 
any predetermined purpose. Furthermore, there was no connection with 
tourist infrastructures or the development of tourism since the beverage duty 
was also levied in areas where there were little or no tourism. Additionally, 
the CJEU noted that taxes already existed in Austria which specifically 
concerned the promotion of tourism.80 Finally, Austria had contended that 
the beverage duty was intended to protect public health, since it encouraged 
the consumption of non-alcoholic beverages, which were subject to a lower 
rate than that used for alcoholic beverages.81 On this point, the CJEU 
pronounced that direct sales of wine in Austria were exempted from 
beverage duty and thus disregarded the Austrian explanation that the duty 
was intended to discourage the consumption of alcoholic beverages and to 
protect public health.82   
2.1.3 Direct link between the use of the revenue and the purpose of the 
tax 
Furthermore, it follows of Transportes Jordi Besora83 that an internal 
allocation rule is not enough in itself, but that there has to be a direct link 
between the use of the revenue and the purpose of the tax at issue. This has 
also later been confirmed by the CJEU in Statoil Fuel & Retail Eesti.84 
Transportes Jordi Besora regards a Spanish tax on retail sale of certain 
hydrocarbons, i.e. petrol, diesel, heavy fuel oil and kerosene not used as 
heating fuel (hereafter referred to as ‘the IVMDH’). Transportes Jordi 
Besora (hereafter referred to as ‘TJB’), a Catalonian haulage company, had 
paid, as final consumer, a total of EUR 45,632.38 in respect of the IVMDH 
for the tax years 2005 to 2008.85 TJB had requested for a refund of that 
amount from the Catalonian Excise Duty Authorities. As grounds for its 
request, TJB had invoked that the IVMDH was contrary to Article 1(2) of 
the General Arrangements Directive since it pursued a purely budgetary 
                                                 
80 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 35 
81 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 36 
82 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 37 
83 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108 
84 Case C-553/13 Tallinna Ettevõtlusamet v Statoil Fuel & Retail Eesti AS [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:149, para 41 
85 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 14 
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objective. Moreover, TJB had summoned that the IVMDH complied with 
neither the scheme of VAT or excise duty so far as concerns chargeability.86 
The IVMDH was intended to finance the exercise of certain powers of the 
Autonomous Communities of Spain in the field of health, and where 
relevant, environmental expenditure.87 Moreover, in Transportes Jordi 
Besora, it was established that the revenue from the IVMDH had actually 
been allocated to the Autonomous Communities.88  
The CJEU repeated its earlier standpoint established in EKW. Accordingly, 
the CJEU reiterated that the reinforcement of the autonomy of a regional or 
local authority through the grant of a power to generate tax income 
constitutes a purely budgetary objective that cannot, on its own, constitute a 
specific purpose.89 Furthermore, the CJEU emphasised that, since every tax 
necessarily pursues a budgetary purpose, the mere fact that a tax is intended 
to achieve a budgetary objective cannot suffice, unless it has an additional 
specific purpose.90  
The CJEU declared that a predetermined allocation of the proceeds of a tax 
with the objective to finance, by regional authorities, of powers transferred 
to them by the State in the field of health and the environment could 
constitute a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing 
the existence of a specific purpose within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the 
General Arrangements Directive.91 However, such an allocation as that at 
issue in Transportes Jordi Besora, which merely was a matter of internal 
organisation of the Spanish budget, could not, in itself, constitute a 
sufficient condition in that regard. This was the case since, as the CJEU 
explained, “… any Member State may decide to lay down, irrespective of 
the purpose pursued, that the proceeds of a tax are to be allocated to 
financing particular expenditure. Otherwise, any purpose could be 
considered to be specific within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the General 
Arrangements Directive, which would deprive the harmonised excise duty 
established by that directive of all practical effect and be contrary to the 
                                                 
86 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 15 
87 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 26 
88 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 24 
89 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission 
Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 33 and Case C-
82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 25 
90 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 27 
91 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 28 
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principle that a derogating provision such as Article 1(2),  must be 
interpreted strictly.”92 Quite the reverse, in order to be regarded as pursuing 
a specific purpose, a tax would itself have to be directed at protecting health 
and the environment. This would, according to the CJEU, in particular, be 
the case “… where the proceeds of that tax had to be used for the purpose of 
reducing the social costs specifically linked to the consumption of the 
excise good on which that tax is imposed, so that there would be  a direct 
link between the use of the revenue and the purpose of the tax in 
question.”93 
In Transportes Jordi Besora, the CJEU concluded that the revenue from the 
IVMDH had to be allocated by Autonomous Communities to health 
expenditures in general and not to health expenditure which would have 
been specifically linked to the consumption of the taxed hydrocarbons. Such 
general expenditure could have been financed by the proceeds of all kinds of 
taxes.94 Furthermore, the Spanish law did not lay down any mechanisms for 
the predetermined allocation of revenue from the IVMDH to environmental 
purposes. In the absence of such a predetermined allocation, a tax such as 
the IVMDH could have been regarded as being itself pursuing the objective 
of  environmental protection, and thus a specific purpose within the 
meaning of Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive, only if it 
had been designed, so far as concerns its structure, and particularly the 
taxable item or tax rate, in such a way as to dissuade taxpayers from using 
mineral oils or to encourage substituting for other products that would have 
been less harmful to the environment.95 
2.1.4 The requirement of compliance with the EU rules applicable for 
VAT and excise duty purposes  
Furthermore, the power to impose other indirect taxes on excise goods for 
specific purposes conferred on Member States requires compliance with EU 
rules on excise duty and VAT as far as determination of the tax base, 
calculation of the tax, chargeability and monitoring of the tax are concerned. 
However, as the CJEU has remarked in Commission v France and EKW, the 
different language versions diverge regarding the wording of Article 1(2) of 
the General Arrangements Directive.96 Some of the language versions 
                                                 
92 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 29 
93 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 30 
94 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 31 
95 Case C-82/12 Transportes Jordi Besora SL v Generalitat de Catalunya [2014] 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:108, para 32 
96 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, paras 20–27 and Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein 
Wien v Abgabenberufungskommission Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly 
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establish an alternative between compliance with the EU VAT and excise 
duty rules, whereas some of the language versions establish a cumulative 
obligation to comply with those rules.97  
In these cases, the CJEU acknowledged the fact that EU rules on VAT and 
excise duties have several incompatible characteristics. Firstly, VAT is 
proportional to the price of the goods on which it is charged, whereas excise 
duty is primarily calculated on the volume of the product. Secondly, VAT is 
levied at each stage of production and distribution process, whereas excise 
duty becomes chargeable when the products subject to it are released for 
consumption. Correspondingly, input VAT paid on the previous transaction 
is, in principle, deductible for a trader, whereas there is no similar deduction 
system regarding the excise duties. Thirdly, VAT is characterised by its 
general nature, whereas excise duty is imposed only on specific goods. 
Observing the above mentioned, the CJEU recognised that it would be 
impossible for Member States to comply simultaneously with the rules on 
both VAT and excise duties.98 Thus, the CJEU concluded it to be sufficient 
that the national indirect taxes pursuing specific objectives accord with the 
general scheme of either VAT or excise duty.99  
2.1.5 Specific purpose may not conflict with the provisions on 
exemptions 
Moreover, the national indirect taxes pursuing specific objectives may not 
conflict with the provisions on exemptions. This addition was made to 
Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive after the case 
Braathens100 was adjudicated. Braathens deals with a later abolished 
Swedish environmental tax that was imposed on domestic commercial 
aviation calculated on fuel consumption and emissions of hydrocarbons and 
nitric oxide (hereafter referred to as ‘the environmental tax’).101 The tax was 
                                                                                                                            
Ikera Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, paras 40–47 
97 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 23 and Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v 
Abgabenberufungskommission Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 40 
98 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 24 and Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v 
Abgabenberufungskommission Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 44 
99 Case C-434/97 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:98, para 27 and Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien v 
Abgabenberufungskommission Wien and Wien & Co HandelsgesmbH, formerly Ikera 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft mbH v Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 47 
100 Case C-346/97 Braathens Sverige AB v Riksskatteverket [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:291 
101 Case C-346/97 Braathens Sverige AB v Riksskatteverket [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:291, 
para 8 
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calculated by reference to data kept by Swedish Civil Aviation Authority on 
the fuel consumption and emissions of hydrocarbons and nitric oxide from 
the type of aircraft used on an average flight. The tax was charged on each 
flight, at fixed rates per kilogram of aviation fuel consumed and per 
kilogram of hydrocarbons and nitric oxide emitted.102 Braathens, a Swedish 
regional airline company, had received several notices of assessment from 
the Swedish Tax Authorities requiring Braathens to pay the environmental 
tax due.103 Braathens considered that the environmental tax was contrary to 
EU law. Namely, Braathens was of the opinion that it infringed the Member 
States’ obligation following from Article 14(1)(b) of the Energy Taxation 
Directive to exempt from harmonised excise duty aviation fuel except in 
case of private pleasure-flying.104  
The CJEU concluded that the environmental tax was calculated based on 
data on fuel consumption and emissions of hydrocarbons and nitric oxide by 
the relevant type of aircraft on an average flight.105 The CJEU 
acknowledged that the General Arrangements Directive concerns products 
subject to excise duty and other indirect taxes which are levied, even if 
indirectly, on the consumption of such products. The CJEU underlined that, 
with regard to the environmental tax at issue, there was “… a direct and 
inseverable link between fuel consumption and the polluting substances … 
which were emitted in the course of such consumption, so that the tax at 
issue, as regarded both the part calculated by reference to the emissions of 
hydrocarbons and nitric oxide and the part determined by reference to fuel 
consumption, which related to carbon dioxide emissions, had to be 
regarded as levied on consumption of the fuel itself for the purposes of the 
General Arrangements Directive.”106 Thus, the environmental tax was 
found incompatible with the harmonised excise duty system. Ultimately, the 
CJEU emphasised that allowing a Member State to levy another indirect tax 
on products, which had to be exempt according to the General 
Arrangements Directive, would render the provision harmonising the 
exemption entirely ineffective.107 
                                                 
102 Case C-346/97 Braathens Sverige AB v Riksskatteverket [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:291, 
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103 Case C-346/97 Braathens Sverige AB v Riksskatteverket [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:291, 
para 11 
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2.2 Article 1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive 
As illustrated above, the most significant difference between Articles 1(2) 
and 1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive is that Article 1(2) of the 
General Arrangements Directive requires the additional national indirect tax 
on an excise good to have a specific purpose, while levies on products other 
than excise goods according to Article 1(3)(a) of the General Arrangements 
Directive and on the supply of services according to Article 1(3)(b) of the 
General Arrangements Directive, respectively, pose no such requirement. 
This difference between Articles 1(2) and 1(3) was also highlighted Ottmar 
Hermann108. In Ottmar Hermann, Mr. Hermann, liquidator of Volkswirt 
Weinschänken GmbH (hereafter ‘the Company’), challenged the lawfulness 
of a tax on alcoholic beverages imposed by the City of Frankfurt am Main 
(hereafter referred to as ‘the local beverage tax’).  
The Company had operated a restaurant in Frankfurt, and was thus liable to 
pay the local beverage tax under the municipal law. The fundamental 
question in this case was whether the local beverage tax related to products 
subject to excise duty for the purposes of Article 1(2) of the General 
Arrangements Directive or to the supply of services relating to excise goods 
within the meaning of Article 1(3)(b) of the General Arrangements 
Directive.109  
In Ottmar Hermann, the CJEU attached decisive importance to the fact that, 
in case of the local beverage tax, the chargeable event was the supply for 
consideration of alcoholic beverages for immediate consumption on the 
premises. Unlike in EKW, in which the beverage tax was levied on the 
supply for consideration of alcoholic beverages, the chargeable event in 
Ottmar Hermann was not the mere supply of such beverages but, on the 
contrary, referred to a transaction involving a supply of services.110  
With reference, by analogy, to the principle of unity of supply established in 
Faaborg-Gelting Linien111, the CJEU maintained that when determining “… 
whether a national tax applies to products subject to excise duty for the 
purposes of Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive or, rather, 
to services supplied in relation to such products for the purposes of Article 
1(3)(b), regard must be had to the predominant feature of the transaction 
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111 Case C-231/94 Faaborg-Gelting Linien A/S v Finanzamt Flensburg [1996] 
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on which it is imposed”112. Accordingly, the CJEU notified that where the 
marketing of a product is always accompanied by a minimal supply of 
services, e.g. the displaying of the products on shelves or the issuing of an 
invoice, only services other than those which necessarily accompany the 
marketing of a product may be taken into account when assessing the part 
played by the supply of services within the whole of a complex transaction 
also involving the supply of a product.113 Furthermore, the CJEU laid down 
that it is not possible to state generally that, for all the operations falling 
within the scope of a certain tax, the features relating to the supply of 
services would always predominate.114 Hence, it is necessary to individually 
determine each transaction’s predominant nature.115  
The Company had operated a restaurant.116 The CJEU stated that, in context 
of a restaurant business such as the Company’s, the supply of alcoholic 
beverages to customers in catering context was accompanied by a series of 
services other than the operations which were necessarily connected with 
marketing of the alcoholic beverages. Those services consisted in placing an 
infrastructure at the customer’s disposal, e.g. dining room, toilets etc.; 
providing the customer with advice and explanations concerning the 
beverages served; serving them to him in a suitable container; serving at 
table; and, finally, clearing the tables and cleaning after the food and drink 
had been consumed.117 In such context, a supply of alcoholic beverages was 
thus characterised by an array of features and acts, of which the supply of 
the product itself was only one component, and in which services thus 
predominated.118 Consequently, the CJEU considered the local beverage tax 
as a tax on the supply of services relating to excise goods which thus fell 
within the scope of Article 1(3)(b) of the General Arrangements 
Directive.119   
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2.3 The Energy Taxation Directive 
The Energy Taxation Directive defines the taxable energy products and 
electricity, the uses that make them subject to tax, and the minimum rates 
that Member States must apply on energy products and electricity 
depending on the use. ‘Energy products’ covered are listed in the Energy 
Taxation Directive. The list includes various products used as heating or 
motor fuels defined based on Combined Nomenclature codes (hereafter ‘CN 
code(s)’).120 Among others, various mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
of their distillation, which comprise e.g. different types of petrol and gas oil 
(i.e. “diesel”), are included.121 In addition, the list also includes the products 
falling within the CN code for not elsewhere specified and included 
chemical products and preparations if these are intended for use as heating 
fuel or motor fuel.122  
According to the preamble to the Energy Taxation Directive, the proper 
functioning of the internal market and the achievement of the objectives of 
other EU policies require minimum levels of taxation to be laid down at EU 
level for most energy products.123 Furthermore, appreciable differences in 
the national legislation on levels of energy taxation applied by Member 
States could prove detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal 
market.124 Accordingly, Member States must impose taxation to the energy 
products and electricity covered which may not be less than the minimum 
levels prescribed in the Energy Taxation Directive.125 ‘Level of taxation’ 
means the total charge levied in respect of all indirect taxes (except VAT) 
calculated, directly or indirectly, on the quantity of the energy product or 
electricity at the time of release for consumption.126 Regarding carbon-based 
motor fuels used in motor vehicles, i.e. petrol and diesel, minimum levels of 
taxation are expressed in euro per 1 000 litres.127  
Furthermore, Member States may apply differentiated rates of taxation on 
the same product under certain conditions. Provided that the prescribed 
minimum levels of taxation are respected, differentiated rates are allowed 
e.g. when those are directly linked to product quality or when the product is 
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used for local public passenger transport including cabs; waste collection; 
armed forces and public administration; disabled people; or ambulances. 
Moreover, Member States may differentiate between business and non-
business uses for tax purposes.128 In addition, the Energy Taxation Directive 
includes some other, mainly structure-related provisions. The most 
noteworthy of these are related to compulsory exemptions and tax refunds 
as well as facultative exemptions and reductions.129 
2.3.1 The Commission proposal for CO2 differentiated energy tax  
Customarily, tax on energy products and electricity has been levied for 
mainly fiscal reasons.130 Nevertheless, tax on energy products and electricity 
is also one of the market-based instruments at the EU’s disposal to reach its 
’20-20-20’ target related to reducing GHG emissions.131 However, taking 
into account the energy content of the various products, minimum levels of 
taxation established by the Energy Taxation Directive vary substantially. 
Accordingly, some products are given preference over others, coal being 
treated most favourably. Moreover, the price signals that the Energy 
Taxation Directive give are not properly related to the need to combat 
climate change. In spite of the growing market for renewable fuels, the 
standard taxation rate of those is based on volume and on the rate applicable 
to the fossil fuel replaced by it. Furthermore, taxes on energy products and 
electricity are levied the same way whether or not, in a particular case, the 
limitation of CO2 emissions is ensured through the EU ETS. Mechanisms of 
EU law intended to limit CO2 emissions may overlap in certain cases with 
double taxation as result, while they may be completely missing in others so 
that double non-taxation occurs.132  
Implying that the Energy Taxation Directive was outdated as it did not 
reflect the contemporary EU policy objectives in the areas of energy and 
climate change, the Council made request to bring the Energy Taxation 
Directive more closely into line with those objectives in March 2008.133 
Consequently, the Commission presented the proposal COM(2011) 196 
final that aimed at restructuring the EU framework for the taxation of energy 
products and electricity in April 2011. The proposal aimed at (1) ensuring 
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consistent treatment of energy sources within the Energy Taxation Directive 
in order to provide a genuine level playing field between energy consumers 
independent from the energy source used; (2) providing an adapted 
framework for the taxation of renewable energies; and (3) providing a 
framework for the use of CO2 taxation to complement carbon price signals 
established by the EU ETS while avoiding overlaps between the two 
instruments.134 
Among other things, the Commission proposed that an explicit distinction 
between CO2-related taxation on the one hand and general energy 
consumption taxation on the other hand. CO2-related taxation would have 
been specifically linked to CO2 emissions attributable to the consumption of 
the energy products and electricity, while general energy consumption 
taxation would have been based on the energy content of those. These two 
components would conjointly have determined the overall rate at which 
energy products and electricity would have been taxed.135 It was specifically 
highlighted that economic efficiency arguments plead in favour of 
introducing CO2-related taxes as complement to the EU ETS. However, the 
Commission emphasised that Member States should also in continuation 
have been able to tax consumption of motor fuels and heating fuels for 
purely fiscal purposes in a way not linked to reductions of GHG emissions. 
Hence, the Energy Taxation Directive would have allowed for 
diversification of objectives with the tax on energy products and electricity. 
In order to ensure that, to the extent possible, all the different objectives 
(e.g. fiscal and environmental) could have been pursued in a consistent 
manner, the Commission considered that taxation on energy products and 
electricity other than CO2-related taxation should have been linked to the 
energy content of the products.  
The Parliament approved the proposal as amended and called the 
Commission to alter its proposal accordingly.136 Most notably, the 
alignment of motor fuel taxation was rejected.137 Moreover, as changing the 
Energy Taxation Directive is a matter of harmonisation of legislation 
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concerning excise duties, it requires unanimous vote in the Council.138 After 
negotiations between Member States in the Council proved unsuccessful, 
the Commission withdrew the proposal in 2015.139 Hence, CO2 element was 
not included in fuel taxation within the harmonised EU excise duty system. 
3 EU VAT 
Article 401 of the VAT Directive states that, without prejudice to other 
provisions of EU law, the VAT Directive shall not prevent a Member State 
from maintaining or introducing taxes on insurance contracts, taxes on 
betting and gambling, excise duties, stamp duties or, more generally, any 
taxes, duties or charges which cannot be characterised as turnover taxes, 
provided that the collection of those taxes, duties or charges does not give 
rise, in trade between Member States, to formalities connected with the 
crossing of frontiers. 
As Terra and Kajus have pointed out, the requirement that taxes, duties or 
charges may not be characterised as turnover taxes is an issue that has 
frequently gained the CJEU’s attention.140 For instance, in Banca popolare 
di Cremona141, the CJEU declared that, in order to interpret Article 401 of 
the VAT Directive, that provision must be viewed against its legislative 
background. After reviewing the First VAT Directive142 and the Second 
VAT Directive143, the CJEU concluded that “in order to attain the 
objective of ensuring equal conditions of taxation for the same transaction, 
no matter in which Member State it is carried out, the common system of 
VAT introduced by the Second VAT Directive was intended … to replace 
the turnover taxes in force in the various Member States. Article 401 of the 
VAT Directive accordingly permits a Member State to maintain or 
introduce taxes, duties or charges on the supply of goods, the provision of 
services or imports only if they cannot be characterised as turnover 
taxes.”144 
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The CJEU has repeatedly stated that, among other cases in Banca popolare 
di Cremona, to decide whether a tax, duty or charge should be characterised 
as a turnover tax, it is necessary to determine whether the tax, duty or charge 
at issue has the effect of jeopardising the functioning of the common system 
of VAT by being levied on the movement of goods and services and  
commercial transactions in a way comparable to VAT.145 Moreover, the 
CJEU has laid down that taxes, duties and charges having the essential 
characteristics of VAT must in any event be deemed to have such effect, 
even though they are not identical to VAT in all respects.146 The four 
essential characteristics of VAT established in the CJEU’s case law are: (1) 
VAT is a general tax on transactions relating to goods or services; (2) it is 
proportional to the price for the goods or services; (3) it is charged at each 
stage of the production and distribution process, including the retail sale, 
irrespective of the number of transactions which have previously taken 
place; and, finally, (4) it is imposed on the added value of goods and 
services, the tax payable being calculated after deduction of the tax paid on 
the previous transactions, so that the final burden of the tax rests ultimately 
on the consumer.147 
As said above in Chapter 2.1.2, the question whether the Austrian beverage 
duty was to be considered as a turnover tax and, as such, incompatible with 
Article 401 of the VAT Directive and Article 1(3) of the General 
Arrangements Directive, was up for the CJEU’s adjudication in EKW. The 
CJEU observed that the beverage duty at issue was not intended to apply to 
all economic transactions in Austria. Consequently, neither was it a general 
tax.148 Since the beverage duty lacked the essential characteristic of 
generality of the VAT, it could not be characterised as a turnover tax.149 
Hence, the CJEU pronounced that Article 1(3) of the General Arrangements 
Directive allowed the beverage duty on non-alcoholic beverages and ice-
cream.150 
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4 EU road charging legislation 
4.1 The Eurovignette Directive 
The Eurovignette Directive provides the EU legal framework for charging 
HDVs for the use of certain road infrastructures. This framework include the 
characteristics of the road infrastructures to which EU road charging scheme 
applies, the maximum levels of certain rates and other general conditions 
that will have to be complied with.151 The Eurovignette Directive aims at 
eliminating the distortion of competition between transport undertakings by 
a step-wise harmonisation of the levy systems and by establishing fair 
mechanisms for charging infrastructure costs to hauliers.152 Before the 
adaption of the Eurovignette Directive, a degree of harmonisation of the 
levy systems had already been achieved by the General Arrangements 
Directive and the Energy Taxation Directive.153  
The Eurovignette Directive does not oblige Member States to charge for 
road use. However, in case a Member State decides to charge HDVs for the 
use of the road infrastructures falling within the scope of the Eurovignette 
Directive, it limits Member States’ margin of appreciation regarding the 
design of the road charging regime. This is to safeguard EU’s internal 
market by avoiding overcharging, which could hamper freedom of 
movement.154 Thus, the Eurovignette Directive specifies that national road 
charging regimes shall be related to the cost of construing, operating and 
developing the road infrastructure.155 Additionally, an external-cost 
component may be included.156 The use of road-friendly and less polluting 
vehicles is encouraged through differentiation of levies. Nevertheless, such 
differentiation may be done only provided that it does not interfere with the 
functioning of the internal market.157 
According to the framework provided by the Eurovignette Directive, road 
charging regimes can be based on either road tolling or user charging. A 
‘road toll’ is a specified amount payable for an HDV based on the distance 
travelled on a given road infrastructure on the one hand, and on the type of 
the vehicle on the other hand. A road toll may comprise of an 
’infrastructure-cost charge’158 and/or an ’external-cost charge’159.160 A 
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‘user charge’, in turn, is a specified amount payment that confers the right 
for a HDV to use the road infrastructures covered during a certain period.161 
Member States may not impose both road tolls and user charges on any 
given category of vehicles for the use of a single road section. However, a 
Member State which imposes a user charge may also impose road tolls for 
the use of bridges, tunnels, and mountain passes.162  
Member States may introduce road charging for HDVs on the ’trans-
European road network’163 or on certain sections of that network, or on any 
other additional sections of their network of motorways which are not part 
of the trans-European road network under conditions laid down in the 
Eurovignette Directive. However, this is without prejudice to the Member 
States’ rights, in compliance with the TFEU, to apply road charging on 
other roads, provided that road charging with regard to such other roads 
does not discriminate against international traffic and does not result in the 
distortion of competition between operators. Furthermore, road charging 
shall not result in direct or indirect discrimination on the grounds of the 
nationality of the haulier, or registration of the vehicle, or the origin or 
destination of the transport operation.164  
As general rule, a Member State that chooses to apply road charging has to 
cover all the vehicles falling within the scope of the Eurovignette Directive.  
Nevertheless, it may choose to apply road charging only to HDVs having a 
maximum permissible laden weight of not less than 12 tonnes under certain 
conditions.165 Among others, this is the situation if the Member State 
considers that an extension to HDVs of less than 12 tonnes would create 
significant adverse effects on the free flow of traffic, the environment, noise 
levels, congestion, health, or road safety because of traffic diversion.166 
Furthermore, this is the case also if such an extension would involve 
administrative costs of more than 30% of the additional revenue which 
would have been granted by that extension.167 Member States choosing to 
apply road tolls or user charges only to vehicles having a maximum 
permissible laden weight of not less than 12 tonnes shall inform the 
Commission of their decision and on the reasons for that.168 
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4.1.1 External-cost charge 
The external-cost element that may be included in a road toll, i.e. the road 
charging levy that is based on distance, is the external-cost charge. As 
defined in the Eurovignette Directive, external-cost charge means a charge 
levied for the purpose of recovering the costs incurred in a Member State 
related to traffic based air pollution and/or traffic based noise pollution.169 
The external-cost charge shall vary and be set in accordance with the 
minimum requirements and methods and shall respect the maximum values 
specified and set in the Eurovignette Directive.170 The Member States shall 
define a single specific amount constituting the external-cost charge for each 
vehicle class, type of road and time period. When setting the external-cost 
charge, the Member State shall be guided by the principle of efficient 
pricing. This means that the external-cost charge shall be priced close to the 
social marginal cost of the vehicle charged. Member States shall also 
monitor the effectiveness of the charging scheme in reducing environmental 
damage arising from road transport.171  
Where a Member State chooses to include all or part of the traffic-based air 
pollution in the external-cost charge, it shall apply the mathematical formula 
set by the Eurovignette Directive. This formula gives the air pollution cost 
of a vehicle of a given vehicle class on a given type of road in euros per 
vehicle-kilometre172. The formula takes into account, as variables, the 
emission factor of a given pollutant of the given vehicle class in grams per 
vehicle-kilometre and the monetary cost of the given pollutant for the given 
road type in euros per gram. Member States may also apply scientifically 
proven alternative methods to calculate the value of air pollution costs using 
the data from air pollutant measurement and the local value of the monetary 
costs of air pollutants, provided that the results do not exceed the values for 
maximum chargeable air pollution costs set in the Eurovignette Directive.173 
The emission factors for pollutants shall be the same as those used for by 
Member States to draft the national emissions inventories provided for in 
Directive 2001/81/EC174.175 Thus, the relevant pollutants are sulphur dioxide 
(SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds and ammonia 
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(NH3).176 Accordingly, the Eurovignette Directive does not currently allow 
for including the cost of road traffic related CO2 emissions in the external-
cost charge calculation. 
5 Analysis of Member States’ possibilities to impose 
levies on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles  
5.1 A levy on CO2 emissions is specific 
To begin with, it shall be concluded that levies on CO2 emissions are not, in 
any case, general taxes on transactions relating to goods or services. 
Consequently, as highlighted above in Chapter 3, such levies lack the 
essential characteristics of a turnover tax. Accordingly, Article 401 of the 
VAT Directive does not preclude Member States from imposing neither 
CO2 differentiated road tolls nor a carbon tax on fuel.  
5.2 Carbon tax on fuel 
A carbon tax on fuel is a tax levied on the carbon content of motor fuels. As 
accentuated in Chapter 2, motor fuels are excise goods, the duties on which 
are, as a rule, harmonised within the EU. However, Article 1(2) of the 
General Arrangements Directive provides a derogation from the harmonised 
excise duty system. Of that provision follows that Member States may levy 
other indirect taxes than excise duties and VAT for specific purposes. 
Furthermore, such indirect taxes must comply with the general scheme of 
excise duty or VAT (see Chapter 2.1.4).  
Since Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive is an exception to 
the general rule, it must be interpreted restrictively. Accordingly, the 
requirements for qualifying as a specific purpose are strict.177 The General 
Arrangements Directive does not define what a ’specific purpose’ is 
explicitly. It is clear from the CJEU’s case law that a merely budgetary 
purpose cannot fulfil the prerequisite of the tax having a specific purpose 
(see Chapter 2.1.2). However, there are further requirements on the design, 
or possibly even the impact, of a national carbon tax on fuel in order for it to 
be allowed.  
In the Author’s opinion, the terminology of environmental economics 
facilitates the discussion of the CJEU’s case law in the context of imposing 
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levies on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. Thus, the following concepts 
are employed in the upcoming analysis: 
• ‘Incentive environmental levies’; mean levies that are driven by 
their environmental impact.178 Incentive environmental levies give, 
by making the environmentally degrading activities financially 
costly, a price signal. This price signal serves as an incentive for the 
actor, by making him to bear not only his private costs, but also, at 
least to some extent, the negative external costs of his activity, to 
shift to activities that are less costly and that damage the 
environment less. 
• ‘Financing environmental levies’; mean levies that have the ability 
to finance environmental measures.179 
• ‘Fiscal environmental levies’; mean levies that primarily are 
designed to meet the demand of revenue.180 
Advocate General Saggio already in his Opinion in EKW declared that, 
bearing in mind that one of the purposes of harmonised excise duties is to 
obtain funds to meet the general budgetary needs, all taxes whose objective 
is other than meeting the general demands of public expenditure, and which 
are not contrary to the EU’s objectives, may be described as indirect taxes 
having specific purposes.181 More precisely, Advocate General Saggio 
expressed that the requirement of a specific purpose in Article 1(2) of the 
General Arrangements Directive can be served both (A) by an allocation 
rule in the national law that links the expenditure of the revenue to the 
accomplishment of particular purposes; and (B) by means of the structure of 
the tax, i.e. by choosing special methods for its calculation.182 The CJEU’s 
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conclusions in EKW conformed entirely to the guidelines provided by 
Advocate General Saggio. Nevertheless, as Ginter et al. have pointed out, 
the CJEU did not explicitly refer to the guidelines that Advocate General 
Saggio suggested in his Opinion in EKW.183 
Advocate General Saggio’s guidelines have, however, later been accepted 
by the CJEU in Transportes Jordi Besora and then confirmed in Statoil Fuel 
& Retail Eesti.184 Although, this was done without explicit reference to the 
Opinion of Advocate General Saggio in EKW. As also Ginter et al. have 
concluded, the CJEU in these cases has established that the allocation of 
revenue to the explicit purpose of the levy constitutes a specific purpose 
only on condition that the revenue spent for the explicit purpose is directly 
linked to the harmful activity that is to be prevented by it.185 Thus, from 
these cases, it can be derived that financing environmental levies, i.e. levies 
the revenue of which is linked, through a national allocation rule, to 
expenditure on accomplishment of the explicit environmental purpose of the 
levy, could qualify as indirect taxes for a specific purpose in accordance 
with Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive.  
When it comes to the fulfilment of the requirement for a specific purpose 
through designing the tax so that it would dissuade taxpayers to behave in a 
less harmful way, some ambiguity still remains. The CJEU’s way of 
reasoning in Transportes Jordi Besora and Statoil Fuel & Retail Eesti gives 
at hand that a levy, in order to fulfil that requirement, would have to be 
designed, so far as its structure is concerned, and particularly the taxable 
item or tax rate, in such a way as to guide behaviour of taxpayers in 
direction that facilitates the achievement of the explicit specific purpose.186 
This line of reasoning would imply that incentive environmental levies, i.e. 
levies designed the way that they, through price signal, would incentivise a 
shift to activities that are less costly and less harmful to the environment, 
could qualify as indirect taxes for a specific purpose in accordance with 
Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive. 
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In this context, it shall, however, be observed that an incentive 
environmental levy’s environmental impact is a result of its effect on 
relative prices.187 With regard to a carbon tax on fuel, for the price signal to 
be effective, those consuming motor fuel have to be price sensitive. Price 
sensitivity is measured by price elasticity of demand. Price elasticity of 
demand is a measure that shows the responsiveness, i.e. elasticity, of the 
quantity demanded of a good or service to a change in price, ceteris paribus 
or, in other words, other things being equal. The more inelastic the demand 
for a product is, the less the demand changes when price changes. 
Moreover, price sensitivity tends to be higher when there are substitutes for 
the product.188 Accordingly, the more inelastic the demand for motor fuel is, 
the less environmental impact that the levy will have. Other way around, the 
more elastic the demand for motor fuel is, the greater the effect of the levy 
will beregardless whether it to its design is an incentive, financing, or 
fiscal environmental levy. Therefore, as Joseph has underlined, an incentive 
environmental levy addressing e.g. motor vehicle related CO2 emissions 
would have the same environmental impact as would an identical levy 
introduced for fiscal reasons.189  
From an economic perspective, it would thus be logical to tie the 
prerequisites of a levy qualifying as having a specific purpose to: (1) 
financing environmental levies confirmed by an allocation rule in the 
national law that satisfies the direct link test established in Transportes 
Jordi Besora and confirmed by Statoil Fuel & Retail Eesti; and (2) levies 
that have a verifiable de facto environmental impactregardless whether 
the explicit purpose of imposing those has been an incentive or a fiscal one.  
If these guidelines were applied, Member States, when imposing a carbon 
tax on fuel, would have two options. Firstly, they could design the carbon 
tax on fuel as a financing environmental levy, the revenue of which would 
have to be allocated to expenditure related to accomplishment of a reduction 
of CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. Secondly, they could design the 
carbon tax on fuel as either an incentive environmental levy or a fiscal 
environmental levy, as long as there would be a verifiable de facto 
environmental impact.  
As regards the second alternative, it must be strongly emphasised that the 
legal situation is uncertain. It might be that only a carbon tax on fuel that 
would be designed as an incentive environmental levy, and that would have 
a verifiable de facto environmental impact, would qualify. From an 
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economic perspective, this would be ridiculous since an equal levy with a 
pronounced fiscal purpose and with an identical environmental impact 
would not qualify. It might also be that a carbon tax on fuel that, indeed, 
would be designed as an incentive environmental levy, but which, because 
of inelastic demand for fuel, would have no significant environmental 
impact, would qualify. This, in turn, would be absurd because it would 
allow Member States to introduce a purely budgetary, i.e. fiscal, purpose 
through the backdoor while such an introduction through the front door still 
would not be allowed.  
Furthermore, besides qualifying as having a specific purpose within the 
meaning of Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive, a national 
carbon tax on fuel should comply with the EU tax rules applicable for excise 
duty or VAT so far as determination of the tax base, calculation of the tax, 
chargeability and monitoring of the tax are concerned, but not including the 
provisions on exemptions (see Chapter 2.1.4 and the discussion below in 
Chapter 5.3).  
5.3 CO2 differentiated road tolls 
The Eurovignette Directive, as it stands today, precludes Member States 
from including CO2 emissions in the calculation of the external-cost charge 
that the road toll may comprise. Consequently, road tolls that are imposed 
on HDVs on trans-European road network or on certain sections of that 
network, or on any other additional sections of the Member States’ network 
of motorways which are not part of the trans-European road network cannot 
be differentiated based on CO2 emissions.  
As a rule, the Eurovignette Directive does not preclude Member States’ 
rights, in accordance with TFEU, to apply road tolls on vehicles or road 
infrastructures other than those falling within the scope of the Eurovignette 
Directive.190 In short, this means that Member States’ may apply road tolls 
on such vehicles or such road infrastructures, provided that they honour 
their obligations in accordance with the Treaties, such as respecting the 
freedoms of movement in the single market and the prohibition of 
unsanctioned state aid.  
Consequently, Member States are free to apply CO2 differentiated road tolls 
in situations that fall outside the scope of the Eurovignette Directive. 
Notwithstanding the requirements of not to discriminate against 
international traffic and not to distort competition between operators, 
Member States may, in that case, decide to form and calculate the road toll 
differently from the scheme established by the Eurovignette Directive.191 In 
this context, the Author would like to strongly emphasise that there are 
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potential problems regarding compliance with EU primary law if a road toll 
that, to its design, deviates from the scheme of the Eurovignette Directive is 
imposed. Moreover, from an administrative point of view, it may be 
assumed that, if nothing else, Member States applying road tolls on vehicles 
or road infrastructures which are subject to the Eurovignette Directive 
would wish to have a fairly coherent regime for road charging. In legislative 
practice, these issues must, of course, be carefully considered. However, a 
discussion on EU primary law or administrative issues related to imposing a 
levy on CO2 emissions from motor vehicles falls outside the scope of this 
Thesis. 
If a Member State wants to follow the model (but not necessarily the 
scheme) of the Eurovignette Directive, the road toll should comprise of an 
infrastructure-cost charge and/or of an external-cost charge. In addition to 
the above-mentioned complex of primary law problems related to departure 
from the scheme of road tolling established in the Eurovignette Directive, 
the EU excise duties legislation places constraints on the Member States’ 
margin of appreciation regarding CO2 differentiated road tolling. 
In line with Braathens, there is a direct and inseverable link between the 
consumption of carbon-based fuel and CO2 emission which are emitted in 
course of such consumption.192 In case of a national CO2 differentiated road 
toll would include, or consist of, an external-cost charge calculated based on 
CO2 emissions, there would exist a direct and inseverable link between the 
fuel consumed, the distance driven, the CO2 emitted, and the amount of the 
external-cost charge. Hence, at least the part of the national CO2 
differentiated road toll consisting of the external-cost charge should be 
characterised as related to an excise good (i.e. motor fuel). 
Furthermore, the question whether a national CO2 differentiated road toll 
should be viewed as a single levy or, in fact, as two separate levies under 
one umbrella concept, must be addressed. This is not least because the 
answer to that question is of immense importance for whether Article 1(2) 
or 1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive should apply.  
If the national CO2 differentiated road toll was to be divided into two 
separate levies for the purposes of the General Arrangements Directive, the 
result would be the following. One of the levies, i.e. the infrastructure-cost 
charge, would, potentially, fall within the scope of Article 1(3)(b) of the 
General Arrangements Directive. The other of the levies, i.e. the external-
cost charge, would, in this case, be a levy on CO2 emissions and, as such, in 
effect, a levy on the consumption of the motor fuel itself for the purposes of 
the General Arrangements Directive. Thus, in case of dividing the road toll 
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into two separate levies, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive 
could apply to the external-cost charge.  
Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive is applicable only to 
‘indirect taxes’. The definition of an indirect tax is based on the assumption 
of shifting of the tax. The legal character of indirect taxes requires the 
possibility of shifting the indirect tax forward, so that the tax, potentially, is 
shifted into the consumer price of the product or service.193 Therefore, the 
question whether Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive could 
apply to the external-cost charge forming a part of the national CO2 
differentiated road toll depends on the design of the road toll. For instance, 
if the taxable person was the vehicle owner, the likelihood of the taxable 
person being able to pass on the cost of the external-cost charge would vary 
depending partly on whether the vehicle was used for business or private 
purposes, partly, in case of business use, on the competition situation and 
the market structure of the given business sector. If a taxable person used 
the vehicle for private purposes, no shifting of the burden of the external-
cost charge would occur. In that case, the levy would be directas opposed 
to indirectand thus would fall outside the scope of Article 1(2) of the 
General Arrangements Directive. On the other hand, if shifting was 
determined to occur, which, in turn, would lead the external-cost charge to 
be considered as an indirect levy, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements 
Directive would apply.  
In case the external-cost charge would be characterised as an indirect tax, it 
should, in order to be allowed, have a specific purpose (see the discussion 
above in Chapter 5.2). Moreover, it should comply with the EU tax rules 
applicable for excise duties or VAT as far as determination of the tax base, 
calculation of the tax, chargeability and monitoring of the tax are concerned, 
but not including the provisions on exemptions.  
As presented above, there is a direct and inseverable link between the 
amount CO2 emitted by a carbon fuel vehicle during a given distance and 
the amount carbon in the fuel the vehicle consumes during that same 
distance. Thus, presuming identical rates would apply, an external-cost 
charge which would be calculated based on the volume of CO2 emitted per 
given distance (e.g. grams/kilometre) by a certain (type of) vehicle would be 
equivalent to a specific carbon tax on fuel if that tax was calculated based on 
the volume of CO2 emissions from combustion of a given volume of a 
certain fuel (e.g. grams/litre) that the vehicle uses. Hence, amount of money 
of the external-cost charge for “Vehicle A” in 100 kilometres would equal to 
the amount of money of the carbon tax on fuel on the volume of fuel 
consumed by “Vehicle A” per 100 kilometres. With reference to 
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Commission v France, the external-cost charge might, in the Author’s 
opinion, thus comply with the requirement of compliance with the general 
scheme of excise duty regarding determination of tax base and calculation 
of the tax.  
However, according to the general scheme, excise duties become chargeable 
when the product subject to it is released for consumption.194 ‘Release for 
consumption’ occurs when excise goods depart from a ‘duty suspension 
arrangement’195, or when they are held outside a duty suspension 
arrangement, provided that excise duties have not been levied at the moment 
of production or upon importation.196 In this context, it is essential to 
observe that Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive deals with a 
specific tax on an excise good. As the relevant excise good here is motor 
fuel, the relevant time of chargeability is the time of release for consumption 
of the motor fuel.  
For example, if the national CO2 differentiated road toll relied on a 
declaration-based system where information on how vehicles have been 
used on the road infrastructures would be obtained afterwards, based on the 
kilometres driven, chargeability of the road toll, and thus, in effect, 
chargeability of the external-cost charge, would occur when a vehicle 
covered would be used on the road infrastructures that would be subject to 
road tolling. Vis-à-vis chargeability, it is thus evident that the times of 
occurrence would not coincide. Consequently, the external-cost charge 
would not comply with the general scheme of excise duty.  
As a result, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive precludes 
Member States from imposing a national CO2 differentiated road toll that 
would have the characteristics of an indirect tax and that would comprise 
only of a CO2 differentiated external-cost charge. The outcome would 
clearly be the same in case the road toll would comprise both an 
infrastructure-cost charge and a CO2 differentiated external-cost charge, 
provided that the road toll would be determined as consisting of two 
separate levies. 
When it comes to the question whether a road toll should be viewed as a 
single levy or as two separate levies, the cases Ottmar Hermann and 
Faaborg-Gelting Linien are fundamental. In Ottmar Hermann, the CJEU 
referred to the principle of unity of supply which it had established in the 
VAT case Faaborg-Gelting Linien. The principle of unity of supply 
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prescribes that, when determining whether a national levy (e.g. the road toll) 
is imposed on products subject to excise duty (e.g. motor fuel) for the 
purposes of Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive or, rather on 
services supplied in relation to such products for the purposes of Article 
1(3)(b) of the General Arrangements Directive, regard must be taken to the 
predominant features of the transaction on which it is imposed.197  
Indeed, whether there is any transaction involved regarding road tolling may 
be up for discussion. An infrastructure-cost charge that would be designed 
according to the model of Eurovignette Directive would follow the ’user-
pays principle’. Accordingly, it would take into account, as cost elements, 
investment costs; annual maintenance and structural repair costs; and 
operating, management and tolling costs.198 That way designed, the 
infrastructure-cost charge would be aimed as an instrument of cost-recovery. 
In addition, paying the road toll would grant the road user the right to use 
the road infrastructures subject to the road toll. In this fashion, road tolling 
could arguably be defined as a transaction where the right to use the road 
infrastructures would be supplied for consideration.  
Going back to the principle of unity of supply and the predominant features 
of road tolling, the Author’s view is that following circumstances should be 
considered.199 A road toll designed according to the model of Eurovignette 
Directive may consist of two components: the infrastructure-cost charge and 
the external-cost charge. In essence, payment of the road toll confers the 
user the right to drive with a motor vehicle covered on the road 
infrastructures that are subject to the road toll. As said above, it is correct 
that the CO2 differentiated external-cost charge per se is equivalent to a 
carbon tax on fuel. On the one hand, it could thus be argued that an external-
cost charge, when combined with an infrastructure-cost charge, would 
ultimately be reduced to a component on the basis of which the price of the 
right to use the road infrastructures would be determined in an individual 
case. Nevertheless, the problem with this argument is that the amount of the 
external-cost charge, as opposed to the amount of the infrastructure-cost 
charge, is not dependent only on the distance driven but also on the CO2 
emitted. Thus, if different fuel, or similar vehicle using fuel with lower 
carbon content, was used instead, the amount of the infrastructure-cost 
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charge would remain unchanged, while the amount of the external-cost 
charge would change. This notion attracts the Author to believe that the 
external-cost charge lacks such connection to the infrastructure-cost charge, 
which would make the principle of unity of supply applicable. This, in turn, 
would have as consequence that the road toll would have to be divided into 
two different levies of which the infrastructure-cost charge would be defined 
as a tax on the supply of services for the purposes of Article 1(3)(b) of the 
General Arrangements Directive and the external-cost charge as a 
(potentially) another indirect tax on fuel. In case of classification as a 
separate levy, and provided that the road toll would be classified as an 
indirect tax, the external-cost charge would, again, have to fulfil the 
requirements set up in Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive.  
With reference to the discussion above regarding the external-cost charge in 
the light of Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive, the Author 
has her doubts on whether it currently would be possible for Member States 
to apply CO2 differentiated road tolls on vehicles and/or road infrastructures 
even other than those covered by the Eurovignette Directive. Therefore, the 
Author’s opinion is that Member States wishing to internalise the cost of 
CO2 emissions related to road transportation are today, in practice, left with 
the option to impose a carbon tax on fuel that complies with Article 1(2) of 
the General Arrangements Directive. 
5.4 Combining CO2 differentiated road tolls and a carbon 
tax on fuel 
Having in mind the potential upcoming changes to the Eurovignette 
Directive (see Chapter 6), it is of great interest to discuss whether it would 
be possible for Member States to simultaneously apply a carbon tax on fuel 
and a CO2 differentiated road toll.  
As highlighted above in Chapter 5.3, a carbon tax on fuel calculated based 
on the volume of CO2 emitted from combustion of a given volume of a 
certain fuel and an external-cost charge calculated based on the volume of 
CO2 emitted during a given distance by a vehicle using that fuel are 
equivalent, provided that identical rates would be applied. If a simultaneous 
application of these two mutually equivalent levies was allowed according 
to Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive, it would mean that 
two separate levies, imposed on the same excise good, could qualify as 
having a specific purpose with the same specific purpose.   
Furthermore, in EKW, the CJEU remarked, in connection to Austria’s 
argument that the specific purpose of the beverage tax was to be found in 
the need to offset the substantial costs borne by municipalities in connection 
with the constraints resulting from tourism, that other taxes already existed 
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in Austria which specifically concerned the promotion of tourism.200 The 
CJEU’s reasoning in EKW thus suggests that two different levies could not 
qualify as levies having a specific purpose for the purposes of Article 1(2) 
of the General Arrangements Directive when these levies have the same 
specific purpose. 
Hence, the Author is tempted to conclude that Article 1(2) of the General 
Arrangements Directive precludes Member States from imposing both a 
carbon tax on fuel and a CO2 differentiated road toll—at least regarding the 
same type of vehicles. Consequently, Member States would have to choose 
to either impose a carbon tax on fuel or a CO2 differentiated road tolling 
regime. Also, it is worth observing that the Energy Taxation Directive 
already allows Member States charging for road use to apply a reduced rate 
for gas oil used for the vehicles covered by the road charging regime.201  
6 Future of road charging at EU level 
Already in the Transport White Paper of 2011, the Commission 
communicated the need of a review of EU road charging legislation. The 
Transport White Paper aimed to promote a more systematic use of distance 
based road charging reflecting the infrastructure and external costs based on 
the user-pays and polluter-pays principles.202 However, despite the fact that 
road transport is responsible for over 70% of transport related GHG 
emissions,203 while as much as about 25% of CO2 emissions related to road 
transport are estimated to be produced by HDVs, it took until 2014 before 
any official action was taken at EU level to curb CO2 emissions from 
HDVs.204  
On 21 May 2014, the Commission adopted the so-called ‘HDV Strategy’.205 
In the HDV Strategy, the Commission articulated that it had been estimated 
that CO2 emissions from HDVs had grown by about 36% between 1990 and 
2010. At the same time, it noted that estimates predict that total transport 
activity will grow further in the next 40 years. According to scientists, fuel 
efficiency and alternative fuels will somewhat mitigate the effect of that 
growth on CO2 emissions. Nevertheless, under current trends and policies, 
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CO2 emissions from HDVs are estimated to remain stable and thus be about 
35% above the 1990 levels in both 2030 and 2050. As also the Commission 
has highlighted in the HDV Strategy, this would clearly be irreconcilable 
with the ‘20-20-20’ target of lowering road transport related GHG emissions 
by 60% by 2050 compared to the 1990 levels.206  
The manifested objective of the HDV Strategy is to curb CO2 emissions 
from HDVs in a cost-efficient and proportionate way for stakeholders and 
the society. The Commission’s intent has been that the strategy would 
provide stakeholders with a clear and coherent policy framework, and 
indicate likely regulatory developments, thereby facilitating decision 
making and investment planning.207 Also, it has been notified by the 
Commission that the pre-requisite to address CO2 emissions from HDVs at 
EU level would be to render possible to measure and monitor them in a 
transparent and unified way.208 
The chosen EU policy is to steer, by way of introducing price signals on the 
market, the demand and supply of long-distance transportations towards 
more fuel-efficient HDVs emitting less CO2 on the one hand, and towards 
other modes of transportation on the other hand.209 Fundamentally, price 
signalling through internalising the external cost of road transport related 
CO2 emissions in the price of transportation by road is a doomed approach 
without a standardised way of measuring and monitoring CO2 emissions 
from HDVs in the EU.  
Because of the diversity of HDV models and tasks, the Commission is of 
the opinion that it would not be appropriate to measure CO2 emissions of 
HDVs by emissions testing as is currently done for cars and vans. Quite the 
reverse, the Commission considers that a computer simulation tool would be 
better to this end.210 Since 2009, the Commission has, in cooperation with 
industry stakeholders, been developing Vehicle Energy Consumption 
Calculation Tool (‘VECTO’) which is a simulation tool tailored to measure 
whole vehicle combination’s CO2 emissions. This way of measuring CO2 
emissions takes into account the technology and combinations used in the 
HDV and thus includes emissions due to its motor and transmission, 
aerodynamics, rolling resistance, and auxiliaries. VECTO is expected to be 
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the backbone of the future fuel consumption monitoring and CO2 
certification procedures for HDVs in the EU.211 
Likewise, changes are on the way also regarding emissions testing of cars 
and vans. In September 2015, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (‘EPA’) uncovered that certain car manufacturers had installed 
software on certain diesel vehicles that was designed to detect when the 
vehicle was undergoing emissions testing and turned full emissions control 
on only during the test.212 This so-called “Volkswagen emissions scandal”, 
or “dieselgate”, revealed that the current laboratory-based EU type approval 
procedure was rather easily exploitable to artificially reduce the vehicle’s 
CO2 emissions.  
In 2016, the Commission proposed the adoption of the World Harmonised 
Light-duty Vehicle Test Procedure (WLTP).213 WLTP is a new, globally 
harmonised test procedure developed under the umbrella of United Nations’ 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) for measuring CO2 emissions 
and fuel consumption of cars and vans. On 14 June 2016, Technical 
Committee of Motor Vehicles (TCMV)214 voted in favour of the 
Commission’s draft Regulation to introduce TCMV. 215 The setting of post-
2020 EU fuel efficiency and CO2 emissions standards for cars and vans will 
be based on this new test procedure.216 
In February 2015, the Commission adopted the ‘Energy Union Strategy’217. 
Again, the Commission restated the issue that realising transport’s energy 
efficiency potential requires a continuing focus on tightening CO2 emissions 
standards for cars and vans as well as measures to increase fuel efficiency 
for and to reduce CO2 emissions from HDVs and buses. Furthermore, the 
Commission, again, emphasised that the use of road charging regimes as an 
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instrument against pollution and congestion in line with the polluter-pays 
and user-pays principles should also be promoted at EU level.218  
Finally, in July 2016, the Commission adopted the so-called ‘Low-Emission 
Mobility Strategy’219 which gives more hands-on indications on to what 
direction the Commission aims to take the EU road charging framework. 
Congruently, the Low-Emission Mobility Strategy sets guiding principles to 
Member States to prepare for the future by framing the initiatives that the 
Commission is planning in the coming years, and maps the areas in which it 
is exploring options.220 The Low-Emission Mobility Strategy deals with all 
modes of transport, while the focus lies on road transportation, which is the 
most significant source of transport related CO2 emissions.221 
As pronounced in the Low-Emission Mobility Strategy, the EU’s role is to 
create enabling conditions and provide strong initiatives for low-emission 
mobility. In conformity to this declaration, the actions included in the Low-
Emission Mobility Strategy are part of a holistic approach requiring a long-
term active engagement of all stakeholders, e.g. Member States, 
manufacturing and service industries, researchers etc.222 Concurrently, the 
Commission underlines that the transportation service and motor vehicle 
manufacturing industries need the right kind of incentives and investments 
at the right time in order to deliver low-emission mobility solutions and 
innovations to the market.223 Internalising externalities is one of the most 
economically rational ways to introduce price signals that incentivise more 
fuel-efficient transport operations, low-emission fuels, and a faster renewal 
of the fleet. Thus, the Commission considers that the process of facilitating 
the transition to low-emission mobility must include a further move in the 
EU road charging framework towards a direction that better includes 
externalities of road transportation in the costs of those who produce 
them.224 Hence, the Commission expressed that, across the EU, road 
charging should move towards road tolling.225  
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Moreover, the Commission told that it is currently developing standards for 
inter-operable electronic road tolling systems in the EU.226 Currently, lack 
of interoperability between the various systems applied in Member States 
add superfluous costs on road transport operators and hinder mobility within 
the EU.227 The Commission’s objective with this action is to facilitate 
access to markets for new tolling service providers and to reduce overall 
systems costs.228  
Most importantly, in the Low-Emission Mobility Strategy, the Commission 
announced that the Eurovignette Directive will be revised to enable 
differentiation of road tolls on the basis of CO2 emissions. Additionally, the 
Commission declared that it plans to extend some of the principles set in the 
Eurovignette Directive to buses and coaches as well as private vehicles.229 
At the time of writing this paper, the Commission has not yet published any 
proposal on changing the Eurovignette Directive in accordance with the 
guiding principles proclaimed in the Low-Emission Mobility Strategy. 
However, there are rumours circulating that the Commission will publish 
the proposal on 31 May 2017.230 
7 Conclusion 
To conclude, EU excise duties law and the Eurovignette Directive place 
limitations on Member States’ margin of appreciation when it comes to 
imposing levies in order to curb motor vehicle related CO2 emissions. 
Accordingly, Member States need to take account the following when 
imposing a carbon tax on fuel or a CO2 differentiated road toll. 
Motor fuel is an excise good to which the harmonised EU excise duty 
system applies. However, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements 
Directive provides for an exception of that system. Accordingly, Member 
States may apply other indirect taxes on excise goods for specific purposes, 
provided that they comply with the general scheme of either excise duty or 
VAT. 
In accordance with the principle that a derogating provision has to be 
applied strictly, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive must be 
interpreted restrictively.  
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It is clear from the CJEU’s case law that a purely budgetary purpose cannot 
be a specific purpose. In addition, the CJEU’s case law suggests that levies, 
the revenue of which is linked, through a national allocation rule, to 
expenditure on accomplishment of the explicit specific purpose of the levy, 
would qualify as indirect taxes for specific purposes within the meaning of 
Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive. Accordingly, a carbon 
tax on fuel, the revenue of which would be allocated to expenditure related 
to accomplishment of a reduction of CO2 emissions from motor vehicles, 
should qualify. 
Furthermore, the CJEU’s case law indicates that the requirement of a 
specific purpose in Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive 
could also be served by means of the structure of the tax. In particular, the 
taxable item or tax rate should be selected in such a way as to guide 
behaviour of taxpayers in direction that facilitates the achievement of the 
explicit specific purpose.  
When it comes to the fulfilment of the requirement of a specific purpose 
through designing the tax so that it would dissuade taxpayers to behave in a 
less undesired way, some ambiguity as to the content of the law still 
remains. Since a carbon tax on fuel is a market-based environmental policy 
instrument, its environmental impact is a result of its effect on relative 
prices. Thus, from an economic viewpoint, it would be logical to require the 
levy to have a verifiable de facto impact in attaining the specific 
purposeregardless whether the explicit purpose of imposing it has been an 
incentive or a fiscal one. If this guideline was applied, Member States could 
design the carbon tax on fuel as either an incentive environmental levy or a 
fiscal environmental levy, as long as there would be a verifiable de facto 
reduction on CO2 emissions from the combustion of the fuel.  
Nevertheless, it might be that only a carbon tax on fuel that would be 
designed as an incentive environmental levy, and that would have a 
verifiable de facto environmental impact, would qualify. It might also be 
that a carbon tax on fuel that, indeed, would be designed as an incentive 
environmental levy, but which, because of inelastic demand for fuel, would 
have no significant environmental impact, would qualify. From an economic 
perspective, both cases would be irrational, because an identical levy in all 
other respects, besides the explicit purpose of being a fiscal environmental 
levy instead of an incentive one, would not qualify.  
The Eurovignette Directive, as it stands today, precludes Member States 
from imposing CO2 differentiated road tolls on HDVs on the road 
infrastructures that are subject to the EU road charging system.  
In principle, Member States may apply road tolls on other vehicles and road 
infrastructures than those covered by the Eurovignette Directive. However, 
in practice, there are potential problems regarding compliance with EU 
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primary law if a road toll that, to its design, deviates from the scheme of the 
Eurovignette Directive is imposed. 
If a Member State wants to follow the model of the Eurovignette Directive, 
the road toll should comprise of an infrastructure-cost charge and/or of an 
external-cost charge.  
Of the CJEU’s case law follows, that there is a direct and inseverable link 
between the consumption of carbon-based fuel and the CO2 emissions 
which are emitted in course of such consumption. Thus, at least the part of 
the national CO2 differentiated road toll consisting of the external-cost 
charge should be characterised as related to an excise good, i.e. motor fuel. 
Furthermore, the question whether a CO2 differentiated road toll consisting 
of partly an infrastructure-cost charge, partly an external-cost charge should 
be viewed as a single levy or as two separate levies is of great importance 
for whether Article 1(2) or 1(3) of the General Arrangements Directive 
should apply. If the national CO2 differentiated road toll was to be divided 
into two separate levies for the purposes of the General Arrangements 
Directive, the infrastructure-cost charge, would, potentially, fall within the 
scope of Article 1(3)(b) of the General Arrangements Directive. The 
external-cost charge, in turn, would be a levy on CO2 emissions and thus, in 
effect, a levy on the consumption of the motor fuel itself for the purposes of 
the General Arrangements Directive. In case of dividing the road toll into 
two separate levies, Article 1(2) of the General Arrangements Directive 
would apply to the external-cost charge, provided that the road toll should 
be characterised as an indirect tax.  
In essence, payment of the road toll confers the road user the right to drive 
with a motor vehicle on the road infrastructures that are subject to the road 
tolling regime. With regard to the principle of unity of supply, it could, on 
the one hand, be argued that an external-cost charge, when combined with 
an infrastructure-cost charge, should ultimately be reduced to a component 
on the basis of which the price of the right to use the road infrastructures 
would be determined in an individual case. Nevertheless, the amount of the 
external-cost charge, as opposed to the amount of the infrastructure-cost 
charge, is not dependent only on the distance driven but also on the CO2 
emitted. Consequently, if different fuel, or similar vehicle using fuel with 
lower carbon content, was used instead, the amount of the infrastructure-
cost charge would remain unchanged, while the amount of the external-cost 
charge would change. Accordingly, the external-cost charge lacks such 
connection to the infrastructure-cost charge, which would make the 
principle of unity of supply applicable. Of that follows that the CO2 
differentiated road toll should be viewed as two separate levies for the 
purposes of the General Arrangements Directive. Therefore, on condition 
that the road toll would be characterised as an indirect tax, Article 1(2) of 
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the General Arrangements Directive should apply to the external-cost 
charge. 
 According to the general scheme, excise duties become chargeable when 
the product subject to it is released for consumption. As the relevant excise 
good with regard to a CO2 differentiated road toll is motor fuel, the relevant 
time of chargeability is the time of release for consumption of the motor 
fuel. Supposing the national CO2 differentiated road toll would rely on a 
declaration-based system where information on how the vehicles have been 
used on the road infrastructures would be obtained afterwards, based on the 
kilometres driven, chargeability of the road toll, and thus, in effect, 
chargeability of the external-cost charge, would occur when the vehicle 
would be used on the road infrastructures that would be subject to road 
tolling. Vis-à-vis chargeability, it is thus evident that the times of occurrence 
would not coincide. Consequently, the external-cost charge would not 
comply with the general scheme of excise duty. 
In conclusion, Member States wishing to impose levies on CO2 emissions 
from motor vehicles are thus today, in practice, left with the option to 
impose a carbon tax on fuel that complies with Article 1(2) of the General 
Arrangements Directive. 
It is of interest to observe that the Commission is currently preparing for a 
proposal to revise the Eurovignette Directive. Among other things, the 
Commission’s intention is to enable differentiation of road tolls on the basis 
of CO2 emissions. At the moment, there is no standardised way of 
measuring and monitoring CO2 emissions from HDVs in the EU. Without 
such standardisation, it is not possible to introduce CO2 emissions as an 
external-cost element into the calculation of the external-cost charge of the 
Eurovignette Directive. However, the Commission has since 2009 been 
developing, in cooperation with industry stakeholders, VECTO, which is a 
simulation tool tailored to measure whole vehicle combination’s CO2 
emissions. VECTO is expected to be the backbone of the future fuel 
consumption monitoring and CO2 certification procedures for HDVs in the 
EU. In addition, it could also be used as basis for calculation of a CO2 
differentiated external-cost charge for the purposes of EU road charging 
legislation. 
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